FDI Protectionism Is on the Rise by Sauvant, Karl P.
Policy Research Working Paper 5052
FDI Protectionism Is on the Rise
Karl P. Sauvant
The World Bank
























































Produced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
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Over the past two decades or so, countries have 
liberalized their FDI regulatory frameworks and have 
put in place an international investment law regime 
that provides various protections for international 
investors. In the past few years, however, there are signs 
that countries are reevaluating their approach toward 
such investment. As a result, FDI protectionism is on 
the rise, with screening of inward M&As becoming 
more frequent. Typically, this is being done under the 
guise of "national interest" or similar concepts, often 
This paper—a product of the  International Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network 
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policy responses to the crisis. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
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linked to strategic sectors and national champions. 
While the international investment law regime faces a 
challenge to find the right balance between the rights and 
responsibilities of governments and investors, care needs 
to be taken that the rise of FDI protectionism does not 
endanger a rules-based approach to FDI. An independent 
FDI Protectionism Observatory to monitor new 
protectionist measures and name and shame countries 
that take them is therefore needed.
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The Rise of FDI and the nature of the international investment regime 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the most important vehicle to bring goods and services 
to foreign markets. World annual FDI inflows rose from an average of $50 billion during 
1981-1985 to $1.9 trillion in 2007 (figure 1);1 in the case of a number of emerging 
markets, a good part of outward FDI is being undertaken by state-owned entities2 (which, 
as will be discussed below, are subject to particular scrutiny in a number of countries). 
By the end of 2007, world FDI flows had accumulated to a stock of $15 trillion, 
controlled by over 80,000 multinational enterprises (MNEs) that have more than 800,000 
foreign affiliates. World FDI flows declined in 2008 by 15 percent as a result of the 
financial crisis and recession; they will decline further in 2009, perhaps by as much as 50 
percent.3 Even with this decline, however, the level of FDI flows is significantly above 
that of the 1980s and the stock of this investment keeps growing: as long as flows are 
positive, the stock of FDI – and hence the importance of international production – 
increases.  
 
Figure 1. FDI inflows, global and by group of economies, 1980-2008 (US$ billion) 
 
Source: UNCTAD, Assessing the Impact of the Current Financial and Economic Crisis on Global FDI 
Flows (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2009), p. 6. 
 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this section are from UNCTAD, World Investment Report (Geneva: 
UNCTAD, 2008) or the Organization’s IIA database. 
2 In the case of China – the biggest outward investor among emerging markets – state-owned enterprises 
accounted for 83% of OFDI flows in 2005; by the end of 2005, their share of OFDI stock was 84%. (See 
Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma, “China’s outward FDI: past and future” (July 2007), p. 15 online: 
http://www.nber.org/books_in_progress/china07/cwt07/cheng.pdf. (These figures do not include FDI by 
state-owned enterprises administered by regional governments.) The Government of China, through its 
“Going Global” policy, is actively supporting OFDI from China. Like their competitors from other 
countries, Chinese firms rely more and more on mergers and acquisitions when entering foreign markets, as 
opposed to greenfield investment.  
 
3 UNCTAD, Assessing the Impact of the Current Financial and Economic Crisis on Global FDI Flows 
(Geneva: UNCTAD, 2009). 
3 
 
The total sales of foreign affiliates amounted to $31 trillion in 2007, which compares 
with world exports of $17 trillion the same year. In addition, the emergence of 
international production networks established by MNEs helps to integrate national 
production systems; this is not only reflected in the ownership and control ties that are 
established, but also in the fact that about one-third of world trade consists of intra-firm 
trade, i.e., trade among the various units of the same corporate systems located in 
different countries. All this makes FDI an important source of capital, technology, know-
how, and access to markets – all tangible and intangible assets that are central to 
economic growth and development. And this importance of FDI underlines the 
significance of an appropriate regulatory regime governing this investment. 
 
The rise of FDI was made possible, to a large extent, by an enabling regulatory 
environment. Especially since the mid-1980s, the investment climate has become more 
welcoming for foreign direct investors. Countries have liberalized national entry 
conditions for MNEs, instituted various measures to attract such enterprises actively (e.g., 
through incentives and the establishment of investment promotion agencies) and 
facilitated the operations of foreign affiliates once established (table 1).4  
 
Table 1. National regulatory changes, 1992-2007 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008: Transnational Corporations and the 
Infrastructure Challenge (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2008), p. 13.  
 
These national regulatory changes have been complemented by international investment 
agreements (IIAs), particularly bilateral investment agreements (BITs), enshrining 
(among other things) the non-discriminatory protection of investment (figure 2). 
Increasingly, moreover, commitments for the protection of international investment, and 
indeed the liberalization of entry conditions, are also included in free trade agreements; in 
fact, the great majority of modern free trade agreements are also free investment 
agreements (figure 3). As a result, and even in the absence of an overarching multilateral 
investment treaty,5 a relatively strong international investment regime has emerged, at 
least as far as the protection of investors is concerned.6 It is enforced, moreover, through 
                                                 
4 Independent of the changes that countries have made regarding FDI, countries have also improved – and 
are continuing to do so – the business climate for investment in general (some of these changes may also be 
captured by the UNCTAD data). Thus, the World Bank observed (Doing Business 2009 (Washington: The 
World Bank, 2008), p. 1) "Worldwide, 113 economies implemented 239 reforms making it easier to do 
business between June 2007 and June 2008. That is the most reforms recorded in a single year since the 
Doing Business project started. In the past year reformers focused on easing business start-up, lightening 
the tax burden, simplifying import and export regulation and improving credit information systems."  
5  There are, however, several multilateral treaties that cover aspects of international investment, most 
notably the GATS and TRIMs agreements of the WTO, as well as MIGA. 
6 There are, however, a number of limitations to this regime. Among others, some limitations are related to 
the fact that there is no overarching multilateral framework governing foreign investment (as the regime 
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an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism that is increasingly used by firms to 
protect what they see to be their rights: there were a minimum of 318 known treaty-based 
international investor-State disputes by the end of 2008,7 with 30% of them brought by 
investors during 2006-2008 (figure 4). For comparison: 91 panel reports were issued 
under Article XXIII of the GATT between 1948 and 1994, and 161 panels were 
established by the Dispute Settlement Body under the WTO between the beginning of 
1995 and November 24, 2008.8 
 









































Source: UNCTAD, www.unctad.org/iia 
                                                                                                                                                 
consists of a great number of international investment agreements that are not identical in their language), 
some of them are related to the regime’s unbalanced nature and some of them are related to the workings of 
the arbitral system. One of the first to deal with some of these issues was José E. Alvarez, “Remarks,” 
American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 86th Annual Meeting, Apr. 1-4, 1992, at 550-
555 (1992). See also, Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Regulating multinational corporations: towards principles of 
cross-border legal frameworks in a globalized world balancing rights with responsibilities,” American 
University International Law Review, vol. 23, issue 3 (2008), pp. 451-558; Gus van Harten, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); José E. Alvarez, “"The 
evolving foreign investment regime," http://www.asil.org/ilpost/president/pres080229.html; José E. 
Alvarez, “The once and future foreign investment regime,” in Looking to the Future: Essays on 
International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman, forthcoming; M. Sornarajah, The International Law of 
Foreign Investment, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and M. Sornarajah, 
“A coming crisis: expansionary trends in investment treaty arbitration,” in Karl P. Sauvant with Michael 
Chiswick-Patterson, eds., Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), pp. 39-80). Of course, there are differences between these various authors. Some 
call for radical changes, while others focus on specific aspects. 
7 Only ICSID reports the number of cases; hence the actual number of disputes is likely to be higher. The 
following data are from UNCTAD, “Latest developments in investor-State dispute settlement,” IIA Monitor 
No. 1 (2009), UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IIA/2009/6, available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20096_en.pdf. (UNCTAD has the most comprehensive database 
on international investment disputes.) For a discussion of the reasons for this explosion of investment 
disputes, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, “Explaining the increased recourse to treaty-based investment dispute 
settlement,” in Appeals Mechanism, op. cit., pp. 105–126. 
8 It should be noted, however that disputes in the framework of the GATT/WTO multilateral trading system 




Figure 3. Number of international investment agreements other than bilateral 
investment treaties and double taxation treaties concluded, cumulative and per 
period, end 2008 
 
Source: UNCTAD, “Recent developments in international investment agreements (2008-
June 2009),” IIA Monitor No. 3 (2009), UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IIA/2009/8, available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//webdiaeia20098_en.pdf. 
 




Source: UNCTAD, “Latest developments in investor-State dispute settlement,” IIA 





The rise of FDI protectionism 
There is no doubt that countries continue to improve the regulatory framework for FDI. If 
anything, the current crisis should put a premium on attracting more of such investment, 
be it to shore up ailing national firms or, more generally, increase investment at a time of 
recession. Indeed, as reports by the OECD and UNCTAD show,9 this is taking place. 
Thus, the OECD reports that the “thrust of investment policy changes is, for the most part, 
toward greater openness and clarity… During the reporting period, six countries changed 
the laws governing their investment policies. Although the intended thrust of the policies 
is somewhat ambiguous, most of the changes aimed (according to announcements or 
notifications by governments) at increasing openness and clarity for investors.”10 
Similarly, UNCTAD reports, “a substantial number of policy changes surveyed were 
directed at facilitating investment. The crisis has galvanized G-20 members to promote 
and facilitate FDI and to create clarity and stability concerning their investment 
frameworks. Furthermore, a number of G-20 member countries have further encouraged 
their companies to venture abroad, and to support their foreign affiliates in times of 
economic crisis.”11  
 
At the same time, however, there are strong and visible signs that a re-evaluation of the 
open framework for FDI is under way, and this is reflected in the national and 
international rules governing this investment.12 
 
This change is most distinct so far at the national level. During the period 1992-2002, 6 
percent of a total of 1,550 regulatory changes relating to FDI were in the direction of 
making the investment climate less welcoming (i.e., 94 percent of the regulatory changes 
were favorable to MNEs – table 1). The share of unfavorable changes doubled to 12 
percent of all regulatory changes during 2003-2004, and again almost doubled to 21 
percent of all regulatory changes during 2005-2007. In the case of Latin America, some 
60 percent of all FDI regulatory changes in 2007 were unfavorable to foreign investors 
(figure 5). Moreover, these data refer to formal changes in laws and regulations; no data 
are available on the extent to which unchanged laws and regulations are implemented in a 
more restrictive manner, increasing informal barriers to the entry and operations of 
foreign investors in a discriminatory manner. 
 
Overall, countries that had implemented at least one regulatory change that made the 
investment framework less welcoming during 2006-2007 accounted for some 40 percent 
                                                 
9 OECD, “Status report: inventory of investment measures taken between 15 November 2008 and 15 June 
2009” (Paris: OECD, 2009), mimeo., and UNCTAD, “Investment policy developments in G-20 countries” 
(Geneva: United Nations, 2009), mimeo. Together with the WTO, these three organizations will issue a 
joint report in September 2009 reviewing regulatory changes regarding FDI. 
10 OECD, “Status report: inventory of investment measures taken between 15 November 2008 and 15 June 
2009,” op. cit., p. 5. 
11 UNCTAD, “Investment policy developments in G-20 Countries,” op. cit., para. 26. 
12 For a full discussion, see Karl P. Sauvant, “Driving and countervailing forces: a rebalancing of national 
FDI policies,” in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2008-2009 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 259-260.  
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of world FDI flows13—an impressive figure that demonstrates quite convincingly that a 
change is underway. 
 
 

















More favourable to FDI Less favourable to FDI
 




While it is clear that something is happening, not every measure that makes the 
investment climate less welcoming for foreign direct investors is protectionist. Basically, 
there are two situations that qualify as FDI protectionism: in the context of inward FDI, 
FDI protectionism involves new measures by public authorities that are taken to prevent 
or discourage foreign direct investors from investing in, or staying in, a host country. In 
the context of outward FDI, FDI protectionism involves measures directed at domestic 
companies that require them to repatriate assets or operations to the home country or 
discourage certain types of new investments abroad. In fact, the situation is more 
complicated because, for instance, measures taken in the interest of legitimate public 
policy objectives – e.g., protecting national security, seeking to increase the contribution 
of FDI to the host or home economy – are not necessarily instances of FDI protectionism, 
even if they make the investment climate less hospitable for foreign investors. 
 
Even with this caveat, it is clear that the regulatory framework is becoming more 
restrictive. It predates the current financial crisis and recession, suggesting that a 
reevaluation of the costs and benefits of FDI had already been underway. The financial 
crisis and recession may dampen the rise of FDI protectionism as countries seek capital to 
                                                 
13 Sauvant, “Driving and countervailing forces,” in Investment Yearbook, op. cit., pp. 239-240. 
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shore up local firms and to increase investment to help them emerge from the recession. 
But the crisis may also accentuate protectionism, especially if nationalistic impulses gain 
the upper hand, perhaps stimulated by fire-sales of domestic assets (as we saw during the 
Asian financial crisis14).  
 
The principal approach that has been taken to make the regulatory framework more 
restrictive for foreign investors is to evoke “national interests,” “essential security 
interests” or similar concepts (often linked to strategic sectors and national champions), 
to screen foreign investments at the national level. These concepts are typically not 
defined precisely, thereby giving governments of host countries discretion to limit the 
applicability of the regulatory framework and opening potentially the door for 
discriminatory treatment of foreign investors. This approach also focuses on cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As)15 and pays particular attention to sovereign FDI (i.e., 
FDI undertaken by sovereign wealth funds and state-owned enterprises).  
 
The measures taken by the US are illustrative. On the one hand, the US remains one of 
the most open countries for FDI, as underlined, for example, in the May 2007 statement 
on “Open economies” by former President George W. Bush16 and the establishment of an 
“Invest in America” office in the Department of Commerce.  
 
At the same time, though, and especially in the aftermath of 9/11, national security 
concerns have risen in prominence.17 For the US, this concept involves primarily (but not 
only) military security, namely the protection of the defense industrial base and critical 
technologies that provide a military advantage, as well as more broadly the protection of 
assets that constitute critical infrastructure18 (the damage to which could harm the 
                                                 
14 See James Zhan and Terutomo Ozawa, Business Restructuring in Asia: Cross-border M&As in the Crisis 
Period (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press, 2001). 
15 M&As account for the bulk of FDI in developed countries and a substantial share of FDI in emerging 
markets. A 2007 Economist Intelligence Unit survey of 258 senior executives across Asia found that the 
US (24 percent), China (23 percent) and France (13 percent) are regarded as the countries most likely to 
block M&As because of strategic or political considerations. See Norton Rose, Cross-border M&A: the 
Asian Perspective (London: EIU and Norton Rose, 2007), p. 4. It would however be wrong to conclude 
from these data that M&As are typically resisted: the bulk are normal commercial transactions that receive 
little attention (unless competition issues are involved). 
16 “President Bush’s Statement on Open Economies,” May 10, 2007, available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070510-3.html. 
17 To quote the then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Henry M. Paulson: “Foreign investment into the United 
States, especially by sovereign wealth funds and state-owned enterprises, is also increasingly viewed with 
suspicion by some U.S. companies, various members of the national security community, and the American 
public at large….” See his “A strategic economic engagement: strengthening U.S.-Chinese ties,” Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 87 (September-October 2008), p. 72. 
18 “Critical infrastructure”  is described as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
United States that the incapacity and destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of 
those matters.” In the context of investment, the description refers to “systems and assets, whether physical 
or virtual, so vital to the United Sates that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would 
have a debilitating impact on national security.” See Department of Homeland Security, “National 
infrastructure protection plan” (Washington: Department of Homeland Security, 2006), at www.dhs.gov. 
According to Edward M. Graham and David M. Marchick (US National Security and Foreign Direct 
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nation’s security).  It also includes protection against terrorism concerns and cooperation 
on important geo-strategic security initiatives, such as nonproliferation. To clarify the 
Government’s authority and the process undertaken to ensure that cross-border M&As19 
do not infringe on national security, the United States in 2007 passed the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act (FINSA),20 which codified the role of the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in reviewing the national 
security implications of cross-border M&As. CFIUS has the authority to review and 
investigate cross-border M&As and to negotiate, impose and enforce conditions to 
mitigate any threat to national security presented by any transaction. If a review takes 
place, it must be completed within 30 days. If such a review leads to an investigation, it 
needs to be completed within 45 days.  A transaction is to be investigated if any of the 
following conditions applies: a transaction threatens to impair the national security of the 
U.S, and this threat has not been mitigated during or prior to the review of the transaction; 
a transaction involves a foreign government-controlled entity; a transaction would result 
in control of any critical infrastructure and could impair national security; or the lead 
agency and CFIUS agree that an investigation should take place. If CFIUS recommends 
action, the President must make a decision within 15 days. As can be seen from these 
criteria, there is a presumption that any M&A by a foreign sovereign investor (be it a 
state-owned enterprise or a sovereign wealth fund) reviewed by CFIUS needs to be 
investigated (unless it is determined at the stage of the review that no national security 
concerns arise). 
 
Not surprisingly, the number of notifications to CFIUS and the number of investigations 
rose from, respectively, 55 and 1 in 2001 to 165 and 22 in 2008 (figure 6). (Data for the 
first six months of 2009, however, show a decline of notifications to 36 21– which is a 
pace for 60-70 this year, down from 165 last year; this indicates perhaps the recognition 
that the country needs, at least in the current economic situation, direct investment from 
abroad, including from sovereign investors.) It is not known how many cross-border 
M&As that were intended or initiated did not go forward because of the new US 
regulatory framework.  
 
Other developed countries, too, have put in place mechanisms that allow stricter 
screening, with concerns regarding national interests often being also of an economic 
nature. In Europe, both at the national level and at the level of the European Commission, 
they involve, in particular, sovereign FDI from Russia (and, perhaps in the near future, 
from China) and, more broadly, the protection of national champions. Specific national 
policy responses include: 
 Germany: A recent amendment to the Foreign Trade and Payments Act established a 
CFIUS-type review mechanism to protect German firms from certain foreign takeovers. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Investment (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 2006)), this definition covers industries 
accounting for approximately 25 percent of the US non-agricultural workforce. 
19 US regulatory changes do not extend to greenfield investments. 
20 See David N. Fagan, “The U.S. regulatory and institutional framework for FDI,” in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., 
Investing in the United States: Is the US Ready for FDI from China? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
forthcoming). The Department of the Treasury on November 21, 2008 published the final regulations 
implementing FINSA. 
21 U.S. Treasury Department. 
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Acquisitions by non-EU and non-EFTA firms of 25% or more of a German company’s 
voting rights will be reviewed by the Government if they threaten “public security” or 
“public order.” This amendment entered into force on April 24, 2009.22 As in the case of 
the US, foreign investors can voluntarily pre-notify the Government before an intended 
acquisition to obtain legal certainty. 
 
Figure 6. CFIUS filings and investigations, 2001-2008 




























Source: US Treasury Department. 
 
 France: A decree was issued at the end of 2005 identifying 11 strategic sectors in 
which investment proposals fall under the purview of the review authorities. In 2008, 
action was taken to earmark 20 billion Euros for a new state investment fund, among 
other things, to protect France’s strategic industrial assets from foreign takeovers.23 
 Australia: Under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act of 1975, the 
Government must determine whether proposed foreign acquisitions are consistent with 
Australia's national interest (not defined). A new policy was announced on February 17, 
2008 for proposed investments by sovereign investors. It requires that reviews of 
applications by such investors consider six specific issues, including whether an 
investor’s operations are independent from the relevant foreign government; the 
investor’s observance of standards of business behavior; the investment’s impact on 
                                                 
22 See http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Service/gesetze,did=223394.html. Thirteenth Act amending 
the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and the 
Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation, available at: 
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Gesetz/englischer-gesetzestext-eines-dreizehnten-gesetzes-
zur-aenderung-aussenwirtschaft,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf. 
23 Decree No. 2005-1739, JORF no. 304, p. 20779, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/. See also “The French 




Australia's national security; and the contribution of an investment to the country’s 
economy and community.24 
 Canada:  On March 12, 2009, Canada amended its foreign investment law.25 Apart 
from changes that liberalized the country’s foreign investment review process of general 
application, the amendment also included a national security test for proposed 
investments in Canada, which applies to a much broader range of proposed transactions 
than the pre-existing “net benefit” test. Now, a proposed investment may be subject to 
national security review even if it does not exceed the threshold for the net benefit review, 
whether the investment is proposed or already implemented, and even in cases in which a 
minority interest is acquired in a Canadian business (i.e., where there is no acquisition of 
control of a Canadian target). As in the case of other countries, there is no definition of 
what could be “injurious to national security,” and there is a distinct possibility that the 
test could be used to target certain types of sovereign investment.  The details of the 
national security review process were outlined in draft regulations published on July 11, 
2009.26 
 Japan: According to its Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, foreign 
investments that potentially impair national security (not defined), disturb the 
maintenance of public order, hinder the protection of public safety, or have significant 
adverse effect on the “smooth management of the Japanese economy” must be screened 
by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry “having jurisdiction over the business.” The 
Act was strengthened in 2007 through a regulation that requires foreign investors to 
notify the Government 30 days in advance if they planned to acquire 10 percent or more 
of listed companies with technology that can be used in weapons systems.27  
 
Additionally, in response to the global financial crisis and recession, several developed 
countries introduced emergency measures, among other things, to bolster the stability of 
their financial services sectors and to increase the availability of credit to other parts of 
their economies. A recent survey of these measures found “early evidence of 
differentiation between foreign and domestic actors” in these emergency plans. For 
instance, the authors of the survey noted that, under the U.S. Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act, domestic institutions are “the majority if not exclusive recipients of 
capital injections,” and measures taken in the United Kingdom and Germany to promote 
credit throughout the economy may result in “the provision of credit solely to national 
                                                 
24 “Government improves transparency of foreign investment screening process,” February 17, 2008, 
available at: 
http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2008/009.htm&pageID=003&min=wms
&Year=&DocType. An Australian Treasury Media Release (No. 89) of August 4, 2009, entitled 
“Reforming Australia’s foreign investment framework” raised the threshold for a review of private FDI in 
Australia. As a result, and based on 2008-2009 data, “around 20 per cent of all business applications will no 
longer be screened by the Foreign Investment Review Board” (ibid). 
25 The amendments are available at: 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3656090&Langu&File=611#194.  
26 Available at: http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2009/2009-07-11/html/reg3-eng.html. See also Subrata 
Bhattacharjee, “National security with a Canadian twist: the Investment Canada Act and the new national 
security review test,” Columbia FDI Perspectives, no. 10, July 30, 2009. 
27 Available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/kanri/top-page/Taro13-foreign-exchange-and-for.pdf. 
The Act dates to 1949 and regulates foreign transactions; it was amended in 1980 and 1998 to liberalize 
these transactions. See also Financial Times, September 6, 2007. The rules contain a list of 137 products. 
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industry.”28  It is conceivable that some of these measures will lead to international 
arbitrations. 
 
A number of emerging markets also seem to be moving into the direction of a more 
restrictive regime: 
 
 China: China strengthened its review system in August 2006, when the Government 
announced “Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors.”29 The regulation provides that approval is required if a foreign investor 
obtains actual control over a domestic enterprise if the transaction involves a critical 
industry, has or may have an impact on the country’s national economic security, or 
would result in the transfer of famous trademarks or traditional Chinese brands (none of 
these categories is defined). This new screening mechanism was further enhanced in 
November of that year when the  11th five-year plan of the National Development and 
Reform Commission responded to “perceived rising concern over foreign acquisitions of 
leading Chinese firms in critical sectors”  by providing for “ increased supervision of 
sensitive acquisitions to ensure what are termed ‘critical industries and enterprises’ 
remain under Chinese control.”30 The subsequent anti-monopoly law  (which took effect 
in August 2008) “specifically provides that acquisitions of domestic enterprises by 
foreign investors that may have implications for national security shall be subject to not 
only competition review, but also national security review.”31  
 Russia: A 2008 law “On Procedures for Foreign Investments in Companies of 
Strategic Importance for National Defense and Security” requires government approval 
for certain transactions involving foreign investors if (i) the Russian company is engaged 
in an “activity of strategic importance to the country’s defense and national security” and 
                                                 
28 Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kurtz, “The global financial crisis: will state emergency measures trigger 
international investment disputes?” Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 3, March 23, 2009, pp. 1, 2. The 
authors observe further (p. 2): “If this trend continues, there may be differentiation against foreign 
institutions as a matter of fact, even if not on the face of the law.” 
29 Provisions of the Ministry of Commerce, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council, the State Administration of Taxation, the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce, Securities Regulatory Commission of China and the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange on “Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors,” August 8, 
2006, at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=66925. The regulation took 
effect on September 8, 2006. See also China Economic Information Network, Semi-monthly Business 
Review, no. 63, November 28, 2006 
30 OECD, OECD Investment Policy Reviews: China. Encouraging Responsible Business Conduct (Paris: 
OECD, 2008), p. 15. 
31 “China finally enacts anti-monopoly law,” Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Briefing, September 2007, at 
http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2007/sept05/19887.pdf, p. 4. It appeared in August 2008 that 
a “Joint Ministerial-Level Meeting for the Security Review of Mergers & Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors” was in the process of being established to review M&As having national 
security implications and, apparently, also to review new FDI projects with national security implications; 
see Nathan Bush and Zhaofeng Zhou, “Chinese Antitrust – Act II, Scene 1,” at 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/08/10/Oct08-Bush10-24f.pdf, p. 9. As to the possible 
interpretation of “national security,” see the following comment by Xu Jialu, Vice-Chairperson of the 
National People’s Congress: “State security includes national defense security, information security, 
environmental security, and economic security.” Ibid. 
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(ii) the foreign investor would control either the company or rights to “natural resource 
deposits having federal importance.”32 
 India: The government recently introduced investment policy measures that include a 
requirement of prior approval for the transfer of ownership or control from resident 
Indian citizens to non-resident entities in specific sectors, including air transport services, 
banking, insurance and telecommunications.33  
 
These national actions are supplemented by supranational efforts, although these are 
voluntary in nature. Thus, the EU Commission has sought to complement the national 
approaches of members of the European Community, by formulating guiding principles 
concerning SWFs, supplemented by efforts to increase the transparency of SWFs.34 The 
OECD produced guidelines for host country investment policies relating to national 
security.35 Based on the principles of liberalization, non-discrimination, standstill, 
transparency, proportionality, and accountability, these guidelines underline at the same 
time the right and duty of host countries to take measures to protect national security. 
Whether or not a situation involving national security exists is self-judging by the 
governments concerned. And the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds agreed in 2008 on “Generally Accepted Principles and Practices” for SWFs and 
submitted them to the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee;36 it is 
expected that observance of these principles by sovereign wealth funds will persuade host 
country governments not to take restrictive actions. 
 
Several features characterize most of these actions. For one, they seek to balance support 
for an open investment regime – the dominant approach -- with a desire to have sufficient 
flexibility to stop undesired foreign direct investments, typically involving cross-border 
M&As. The criterion most often used is, as already noted, “national security” or related 
concepts – but, and this is crucial, these concepts are not defined precisely but rather left 
open for definition by national governments. Screening mechanisms have the task to do 
that, but their decisions are typically the result of “black box” deliberations and often 
cannot be appealed.37 While this type of decision-making may work relatively 
                                                 
32 The text of the law in Russian is available at http://www.rg.ru/2008/05/07/investicii-fz-dok.html. 
33 Press Note No. 3 (February 14, 2009), available at: http://siadipp.nic.in/policy/changes/pn3_2009.pdf. 
34 Council of the European Union, revised version of the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European 
Council, 13/14 March 2008, 7652/1/08 Rev 1, Brussels, May 20, 2008.  
35 “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country Policies. Letter transmitting the Report of the OECD 
Investment Committee to G7 Finance Ministers.” The earlier version of the report of the OECD Investment 
Committee, adopted by it on April 4, 2008, is attached to this letter; it can also be found at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/9/40408735.pdf. 
36 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG), “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally 
Accepted Principles and Practices, ‘Santiago Principles’” (Washington, D.C.: IWG, October 2008). 
37 To quote the OECD (“Accountability for security-related investment policies” (Paris: OECD, November 
2008), mimeo., p. 6): “The degree to which individual awards and procedures can be contested in courts or 
through administrative appeals mechanisms varies across countries. Some countries (e.g. Argentina, China, 
France, Germany, Korea, Lithuania and the United Kingdom) do allow rejected foreign investors to contest 
the security-related investment policy decisions in various ways. [footnote omitted] 
 A separate issue relates to regulatory decisions made on the basis of classified information. The need to 
safeguard national security may, in this case, militate toward either avoiding legal contestation altogether, 
curtailing the plaintiff’s right to subpoena and examine crucial evidence, or applying specific court 
procedures – or specialised courts – designed to safeguard the confidentiality of sensitive government 
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satisfactorily when the screening mechanism consists of representatives of government 
departments that reflect a plurality of interests, it may work less well when this is not the 
case, for example, where the executive branch or a representative thereof has the sole 
discretion to allow or block an investment (i.e., an explicit political, as opposed to 
administrative, process). In either event, moreover, such screening mechanisms, deciding 
on a case-by-case basis, make the investment climate less predictable and less transparent. 
However, it is clear that sovereign investors receive special attention, i.e., they are treated 
differently from domestic investors and private foreign direct investors, especially, it 
appears, when they are headquartered in emerging markets. Among other things, this 
reflects the fear (for which there is however no systematic evidence) that such investors 
pursue not only commercial interests but also political interests of the governments 
involved.38  
 
While governments need of course the flexibility to pursue legitimate public policy 
objectives (be it national security, economic development or any other critical objective) 
and may have introduced regulatory provisions and mechanisms in good faith (namely to 
protect critical interests), the boundary line between protecting legitimate public policy 
objectives and protectionism is a fine one and, for that matter, not always easy to 
determine. The fuzziness of the key concepts involved inevitably creates the risk of abuse 
for protectionist purposes. This makes it all the more important to watch these new 
regulatory developments closely, especially since the rules that have been put in place 
leave considerable discretion to national policy makers, and their decisions often cannot 
be appealed. In fact, that governments think that it is necessary to put in place screening 
mechanisms suggests that their strong welcoming attitude of the past toward FDI is 
giving way to a certain caution (or at least to a more considerate approach) concerning 
such investment. Moreover, what is worrying is that developed countries are leading this 
change in approach, i.e., countries that had been, in the past, the champions of the 
liberalization of entry and operational conditions for foreign investors and the protection 
of investments under international law. If developed countries change their attitude 
toward FDI, this is likely to have a demonstration effect for emerging markets, leading 
the latter possibly also in the direction of protectionist measures. 
 
It needs to be pointed out that governments recognize that investment protectionism is on 
the rise. In particular, the G-20 (in its communiqués issued in November 2008 and April 
                                                                                                                                                 
information. Similarly, the concerns that motivated a measure may also necessitate withholding 
information from the investor; thus making legal recourse difficult or impracticable. In addition, some 
national constitutions, by allocating authority with respect to national security, may place limits on the 
scope of authority of the courts. 
Some countries allow investors to contest regulatory decisions on procedural grounds. … The coverage of 
the reviews by the judicial or arbitrational instance differs across countries, as does the extent of possible 
remedies, but in most cases a victory for the plaintiffs will lead to a renewed regulatory review rather than a 
reversal of the decisions.” 
38 Considerations of this kind may have played a role in the abortive attempt of CNOOC (China) to take 
over UNOCAL (US) and Huawei’s attempt to acquire a stake in 3Com (US). In light of the financial crisis 
and recession, it appears, however, that attitudes toward one class of foreign investors, SWFs, are 
becoming more welcoming, at least temporarily so. See Veljko Fotak and William Megginson, “Are SWFs 
welcome now?” Columbia FDI Perspectives, No.9, July 21, 2009.  
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2009) called for a moratorium on new investment protectionist measures.39 In its April 
2009 declaration, it furthermore asked “the WTO, together with other international 
bodies, within their respective mandates, to monitor and report publicly on [the G-20 
members’] adherence to these undertakings”; the urgency of this matter is underlined by 
the fact that the G-20 leaders requested that this reporting take place “on a quarterly 
basis.”40 It was further reaffirmed by the G-8 in their July 2009 declaration when that 
Group observed: “We will work to reverse the recent decline in FDI, by fostering an open, 
receptive climate for foreign investment, especially in emerging and in developing 
countries.”41 In its first document issued in response to the G-20 reporting request, then, 
UNCTAD observed that “[o]verall, .. investment policy developments paint a comforting 
picture,” but it also warned “there is no room for complacency. Indeed, a number of areas 
exist where caution in terms of protectionist dangers and investment distortions appears 
warranted.”42 UNCTAD drew particular attention to what it labels “‘smart’ 
protectionism,”43 in which, for example, a government takes advantage of gaps in 
investment regulations to discriminate against foreign investors. 
 
Changes in the international investment regime 
The changes at the national level are also leading to changes in the nature of the present 
international investment regime, for instance in the bilateral investment treaties that make 
up a substantial part of the regime. As already mentioned, at the core of this regime is the 
protection of foreign investors, based on the principle of non-discrimination of foreign 
investors (and, if discrimination takes place, the obligation to compensate investors). The 
changes that are underway in the international investment regime reflect those in process 
at the national level, by giving governments more flexibility to pursue national policies 
vis-à-vis FDI.  
                                                 
39 See, Group of 20, “Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy,” November 15, 
2008 (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/11/20081115-1.html). It said in the first 
paragraph of para. 13: 
“13. We underscore the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and not turning inward in times of 
financial uncertainty.  In this regard, within the next 12 months, we will refrain from raising new barriers to 
investment or to trade in goods and services….” This call for a moratorium was repeated in Group of 20, 
“The global plan for recovery and reform,” April 2, 2009 (available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf). In paragraph 22, the G-20 leaders reiterated: “We 
will not repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism in previous eras. To this end, we reaffirm the 
commitment made in Washington: to refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods 
and services…. In addition we will rectify promptly any such measures. We extend this pledge to the end 
of 2010….”  
40 Ibid., para. 22. 
41 See, G-8 Leaders Declaration, “Responsible leadership for a sustainable future,” July 8, 2009, para. 49. 
In para. 50 (still in the Declaration’s Investment section) the leaders affirm: “Aware of the global nature of 
the markets where our citizens and businesses operate, and of the international effects of our actions, we 
fully stress our engagement against protectionist measures. In this light, we welcome OECD’s efforts to 
monitor restrictions on investments and encourage the ongoing joint work of the OECD Freedom of 
Investment Roundtable (FOI RT) with the WTO, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and the IMF, in this area.” 
42 UNCTAD, “Investment policy developments in G-20 countries” (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2009), mimeo., 
paras. 25 and 27. UNCTAD also warns “there is a need to ensure that current endeavours against 
investment protectionism do not remain one-off initiatives.” Ibid., para. 28. 




Most indicative in this respect is the United States model bilateral investment treaty of 
2004, if compared with the 1984 model.44 It weakens various protections that 
international investors had acquired through BITs and free trade and investment 
agreements and hence gives more rights to governments. In particular, it explicitly 
includes an “essential security” clause that is self-judging. In other words, the treaty 
partners decide on their own, and not subject to arbitral review, whether or not a given 
situation involves an essential security interest and therefore makes it not necessary to 
observe commitments contained in a given treaty.  
 
Such an evolution of the international investment regime is understandable, given that 
governments seek more freedom to pursue what they consider to be important national 
objectives and given that they do not want to be penalized (through arbitral awards 
against them) for actions taken in this respect. But this greater respect for national policy 
priorities is also understandable from another perspective: the international investment 
regime as it has evolved over time has focused almost exclusively on the protection of 
international investors by granting them broad rights and few responsibilities, while host 
country governments assume broad responsibilities and have few rights.45  
 
The need for rebalancing 
The critical challenge therefore is to find the right balance between the rights and 
responsibilities of foreign investors on the one hand and those of governments on the 
other. It needs to be a balance that combines the stability, predictability and transparency 
that firms need to make investment decisions with the policy space that governments 
need to pursue legitimate domestic policy objectives – a balance that does not open the 
door for measures that are primarily protectionist in nature. 
 
Finding regulatory solutions to this challenge is not easy. It is important that the process 
of rebalancing, which is already underway, proceed in a manner that strengthens the 
overall international investment regime. Among other things, this requires a clarification 
of such concepts as “national interest”46 and “essential security interests,” as well as 
                                                 
44 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, “A comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. model BITs: rebalancing investor 
and host country interests,” in Investment Yearbook, op. cit., pp. 283-316, and, even stronger, José E. 
Alvarez, “The once and future foreign investment regime,” in Looking to the Future, op cit. The 2004 U.S. 
model BIT was under review beginning in 2009; it may well be that the outcome is a further strengthening 
of the rights of host country governments. 
45 The underlying logic for favoring protection of investors over preserving host country policy space is, 
among other things, that MNEs are, in any event, subject to the laws and regulations of host countries that 
can be enforced through national courts and that such a regime helps countries to attract FDI. For evidence 
regarding the latter expectation, see Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa Sachs, eds., The Effect of Treaties on Foreign 
Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
46 A survey by the OECD of a number of countries and their use of the concepts of “national security,” 
“essential security interests” and “public order” found that “the term ‘national security’ is shown to have a 
coherent and internationally understood meaning.” (See, OECD, “Security-related terms in international 
investment law and in national security strategies” (Paris: OECD, May 2009), mimeo., p. 4. If this finding 
regarding “national security” does, indeed, hold for a great number of countries, applies also to related 
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concepts such as “critical infrastructure”47 and “strategic sectors,” with a view toward 
arriving at an international consensus as to what these concepts encompass. If such a 
clarification process of a number of key concepts can be undertaken in an international 
organization, that would be desirable, involving as many countries as possible.48 There is, 
of course, the risk that such an intergovernmental approach could become politicized, 
with countries merely restating their respective positions; still, it would be an important 
and desirable step forward. 
 
A more ambitious approach would be to convene an international group of non-
governmental experts from all regions of the world to arrive at something akin to the 
United States policy restatements.49 A "Restatement of International Investment Law" 
would show where there is convergence in the provisions of IIAs, including in terms of 
the rights and responsibilities of investors and States and the definitions of often-used 
terms-of-art in the IIAs. Even if consensus were found on aspects of international 
investment law, this does not mean that all governments would necessarily adopt those 
terms or definitions in the agreements they negotiate; in fact, they may deliberately want 
to leave certain terms (like “national security”) vague, in order to allow themselves 
flexibility for their national policies. For concepts and terms that still vary widely among 
IIAs, the Restatement could present alternative interpretations side-by-side, with 
explanations and commentary where possible. It is conceivable that indicating where the 
law continues to diverge and helping to explain the rationale could be a boost toward the 
harmonization of international investment law. And at the least, such a Restatement that 
clarified terms and outlined differences would be a valuable resource for investors and 
countries alike to understand better the complex investment law landscape, and a useful 
guide for arbitrators and negotiators of investment agreements. 
 
Ultimately, however, a multilateral framework for investment is required to marshal the 
full strength of universal and consistent rules in this area, complemented by a functioning 
dispute settlement mechanism. As we know from the experience in the United Nations, 
OECD and WTO, the creation of a multilateral framework for investment is a very 
difficult task indeed, and one that – if pursued at all in the foreseeable future – will take 
considerable time.50 Still, a clear and consistent multilateral framework—reflecting in a 
                                                                                                                                                 
concepts such as “public order” and “essential security interests” and is supported by arbitral decisions, 
then this would indicate an emerging consensus in this area. 
47 See in this context OECD, “Protection of ‘critical infrastructure’ and the role of investment policies 
relating to national security” (Paris: OECD, May 2008), mimeo. 
48 See in this context some of the publications prepared by the OECD Secretariat and referred to elsewhere 
in this chapter. 
49 The two approaches – an intergovernmental process and a process presumably involving primarily 
academic experts – are not mutually exclusive. 
50 Although, as the IMF SWF Principles show, rules can be formulated quite rapidly if important countries 
desire to do so. It is interesting to note in this context that the G-8, in its July 8, 2009 communiqué, noted: 
“… we commit to enhance cooperation with our major partners to agree upon shared principles which may 
serve as the basis for a more structured and wider process towards an agreed common multilateral 
framework in the long run creating a predictable and stable climate for investment. To this end, we commit 
to work with our HDP/HAP [Heiligendamm Dialogue Process/Heiligendamm L’Aquila Process] partners 
to produce in one year’s time a report on progress made in order to evaluate possible common responses, 
including the feasibility of launching a process with wide ownership, and with participation from relevant 
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balanced manner the rights and responsibilities of investors and governments—would 
provide the most credible and coherent parameters for investment policy-making at the 
national level. And as national policies are as important in the international investment 
law regime as international agreements and treaties, a multilateral effort to define the 
parameters of such national policy-making would strengthen the overall regime 
significantly. While a multilateral investment agreement would be the most powerful 
instrument to guide national policy-making, even a Restatement, as discussed above, that 
illustrated areas of consensus and areas of weakness in the investment regime would help 
set useful parameters.  
 
In the meantime, however, policy-making at the national level will continue to evolve on 
its own. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that a number of governments have put 
mechanisms in place that allow them, if need arises, to screen out specific FDI projects 
that, in their opinion, are not desirable. To what extent they will actually use these 
mechanisms only for the limited purpose of protecting legitimate national objectives – or, 
rather, will abuse them for protectionist purposes – is a matter for watchful waiting. 
International exhortations urging governments not to introduce FDI protectionist 
measures are of course important and need to be reiterated. At the same time, though, it 
would be highly desirable if watchful waiting and international exhortations were 
complemented by an independent FDI Protectionism Observatory to monitor new FDI 
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international organisations such as OECD, UNCTAD, the World Bank, and other major stakeholders.” G-8 
Leaders Declaration, “Responsible leadership for a sustainable future,” July 8, 2009, para. 52. 
51 OECD, UNCTAD and the WTO monitor changes in investment laws regardless of the direction in which 
they go (see the earlier references). The Secretariats of international organizations have, however, the 
problem of pronouncing themselves about the nature of policy changes introduced by individual members, 
as their members will tend to resist that their actions are labeled “protectionist”; rather, members may 
prefer that these measures are characterized as “clarifications” and the like—which, in some cases, they 
may well be. It is in fact not always easy to determine whether a given measure is protectionist, intended or 
not; hence the task of such an Observatory (were it to be established) would need to be carried out in a very 
careful manner.  
